International Illicit Convergence: The Growing Problem of Transnational Organized Crime Groups\u27 Involvement in Intellectual Property Rights Violations by Walterbach, Maureen
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 2 Article 10
2007
International Illicit Convergence: The Growing
Problem of Transnational Organized Crime
Groups' Involvement in Intellectual Property
Rights Violations
Maureen Walterbach
a@s.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Maureen Walterbach, International Illicit Convergence: The Growing Problem of Transnational Organized Crime Groups' Involvement in
Intellectual Property Rights Violations, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2014) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol34/iss2/10
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT CONVERGENCE:  
THE GROWING PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
GROUPS' INVOLVMENT IN  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
Maureen Walterbach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 34 
   
  
 
 
 
 
WINTER 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: Maureen Walterbach, International Illicit Convergence: The 
Growing Problem of Transnational Organized Crime Groups' Involvment in Intellectual 
Property Rights Violations, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (2007).  
 INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT CONVERGENCE: THE 
GROWING PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS’ INVOLVEMENT IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
MAUREEN WALTERBACH* 
 I. THE GROWING PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS 
CONVERGING WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT CRIMES: AN 
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................  592 
 II. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SIDE OF THE CONVERGENCE: THE 
HISTORICALLY LOW PRIORITY TO CRIMINALIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
VIOLATIONS HAS OCCURRED FOR SEVERAL REASONS .......................................  594 
 III. THE ORGANIZED CRIME SIDE OF THE CONVERGENCE: THE UNIQUE ASPECTS 
OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS THAT DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF 
PREVENTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THESE 
GROUPS .............................................................................................................  595 
 IV. EXPLOITED FACTORS LEADING TO ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS' INVOLVEMENT 
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME .................................................................  597 
A. The Central Factor: Low Risk-High Profit Margins..................................  597 
B. Using Advanced Technology for Commission and Facilitation of Crimes  598 
C. Networking of "Small-Time" Criminals and Organized Crime Groups....  599 
D. Engaging in Intellectual Property Violations at Varying Levels ...............  600 
E. Utilizing the "Dark Side" of Globalization ................................................  601 
F. Adaptability of Sophisticated Yet Flexible Groups ....................................  602 
G. "Jurisdictional Arbitrage"..........................................................................  603 
H. Capitalizing on External Perceptions of Societal Tolerance of 
Intellectual Property Crimes ......................................................................  603 
 V. MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS TO LIMIT THE EFFECTS OF THE FACTORS LEADING 
TO INFILTRATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME INTO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS CRIME .................................................................................  604 
A. Harmonization of Laws Against Organized Crime Groups Exploiting 
Intellectual Property Rights .......................................................................  605 
1. Harmonizing International Intellectual Property Laws and 
Organized Crime Criminalization: Substantive and Procedural .......  606 
2. Harmonizing Intellectual Property Laws with Organized Crime 
Laws Within a Single Nation ..............................................................  611 
3. Analogizing Ideas from Other Substantive Areas to Encourage 
Harmonization of Noncompliant Nations ...........................................  612 
B. Coordinated Sharing of Information, Evidence, and Education by Law 
Enforcement, Intelligence Agencies, and International Organizations .....  613 
1. Information and Evidence Sharing .....................................................  613 
2. Educating Through Past Success and Training for Future ................  615 
C. Investigations: Focus on the Finances, a Central Element to 
Transnational Organized Crime and Intellectual Property Crime ...........  617 
D. Changing the Public Perception of Intellectual Property Crimes in 
General .......................................................................................................  617 
 VI. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  619 
                                                                                                                     
 * Florida State University College of Law, J.D., summa cum laude, May 2007. The 
author would like to thank her brother, Scott Walterbach, Indiana University School of 
Law-Indianapolis, J.D., May 2007, for his assistance in revising and editing this Note. 
592  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:591 
 
I.   THE GROWING PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
GROUPS CONVERGING WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT CRIMES: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
 The European Council’s case study of Russia and economic crimes 
showed intellectual property as one of “the primary targets for the in-
filtration of organised economic crime.”1 All six organized crime 
groups from Taiwan and Hong Kong in a pilot study were involved in 
pirating CDs and DVDs, and pirating was the dominant activity for 
one group.2 NATO reported that Nigerian organized crime groups 
were engaged in large-scale counterfeiting operations.3 DrinkOrDie, 
a group founded in Russia, grew to the largest online piracy network 
before getting caught by U.S. federal authorities and included hack-
ers from the United States, Australia, Norway, Finland, the United 
Kingdom, and others.4 
 The preceding examples reveal a recent phenomenon. Intellectual 
property crimes are increasingly facilitated through the involvement 
of transnational organized crime groups.5 The market for intellectual 
property rights violations “has now become a global ‘industry’ man-
aged by sprawling organizations in much the same way as drug-
trafficking, gun-running and money-laundering.”6 Organized crime 
                                                                                                                     
 1. COUNCIL OF EUR., ORGANISED CRIME SITUATION REPORT 2005: FOCUS ON THE 
THREAT OF ECONOMIC CRIME 98 (2005), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/ Le-
gal_affairs/Legal_cooperation/Combating_economic_crime/8_Organised_crime/Documents/
Report2005E.pdf. 
 2. JAMES O. FINCKENAUER & KO-LIN CHIN, ASIAN TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED 
CRIME AND ITS IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPING A TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
RESEARCH AGENDA 10, 37 (2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/213310.pdf. 
 3. KEES ZIJLSTRA, ECON COMM., N. ATL. TREATY ORG. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME—AN ESCALATING THREAT TO THE GLOBAL MARKET, para. 
26 (1998), available at http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1998/ar278ec-e.asp. 
 4. Josh White, Pa. Man Admits Internet Conspiracy; Defendant Headed Interna-
tional Ring that Stole Software, Games and Movies, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2002, at B4; see 
also HEDI NASHERI, ADDRESSING GLOBAL SCOPE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 64 
(2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208384.pdf. 
 5. There is much debate about the definition of organized crime. The focus of this 
Note is not on what is organized crime, so that parsing of the definition will not be in-
cluded. The following definition will be used for purposes of this Note: 
“Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of 
committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance 
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit. . . . 
Interpol, U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex 
1, at Art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25/Annex 1 (Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter G.A. Res.], avail-
able at http://www.undoc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf.   
 6. Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement by the Attorney Gen-
eral at the Symposium of the Americas: Protecting Intellectual Property in the Digital Age 
(Sept. 12, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipsymposium.htm.  
See also Interpol, Intellectual Property Crime Action Group (IIPCAG)  (2002), 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/IntellectualProperty/Publications/IIPCAG.p
2007]               INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT CONVERGENCE 593 
 
groups are becoming more involved particularly in piracy and coun-
terfeiting.7 As early as 1998, NATO identified the trend of intellec-
tual property violations as a common activity of organized crime 
groups.8 Although there is some skepticism about the exact percent-
age of organized crime comprising intellectual property crime9 and 
the need for stricter penalties, as discussed in Part II, 65 to 70% of 
piracy cases, for example, involve organized crime groups.10 Addi-
tionally, three industry representative groups from the United King-
dom, France, and the United States have recently published findings 
of connections between intellectual property theft and organized 
crime, demonstrating the global nature of the problem and industry 
concern.11 As a result of these studies, as well as several other exem-
                                                                                                                     
df (last visited June 23, 2007) (“Extensive evidence is now available from both the public 
and private sectors which demonstrates that organised criminals and terrorists are heavily 
involved in planning and committing these crimes.”); Harjit Sandhu, Product Counterfeit-
ing and Interpol, 2 INT’L CRIM. POLICE REV. No. 476-477 98, 101 (1999), available at 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/IntellectualProperty/Publications/ICPR2.pdf 
(“What was once a cottage industry has developed into a sophisticated network of organ-
ized crime.”); OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT OF THE DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE’S TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/20041013_DOJ_IPTaskForceReport.pdf; PHIL WILLIAMS, CERT 
COORDINATION CTR., ORGANIZED CRIME AND CYBER-CRIME: IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESS 7 
(2002), available at  http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/cybercrime-business.pdf (noting “the 
growing overlap between organized crime and cyber-crime”); FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2009, pt. II.G (2004), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf (stating that criminal 
enterprises are flourishing globally and that “their impact on the United States is expected 
to increase over the next five years”). 
 7. Reno, supra note 6; see also FINCKENAUER & CHIN, supra note 2, at 10 (“A rela-
tively recent and growing crime problem that is transnational in nature is the production 
and distribution of pirated CDs and DVDs.”); UNION DES FABRICANTS, COUNTERFEITING & 
ORGANISED CRIME 10 (2003), available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/ 
IntellectualProperty/Publications/UDFCounterfeiting.pdf (“[Counterfeiting] clearly has 
links with other forms of criminal activity and its networks cooperate or overlap with 
known criminal organisations.”).  
 8. Zijlstra, supra note 3, at para. 18. 
 9. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 2 (“[There] is still a real gap between the 
official perception of counterfeiting and the experience on the ground of rights holders, who 
see obvious links between counterfeiting and organised crime.”). But see OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 6, at 11 (placing “the highest priority on 
the prosecution of intellectual property crimes that are complex and large in scale”). 
 10. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 11 (citing Lain Grant, Head of Enforce-
ment, Int’l Fed’n of the Phonographic Indus., Address at the European Forum for the Pre-
vention of Organised Crime (Jan. 30, 2003)).  
 11. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7; ALLIANCE AGAINST COUNTERFEITING AND 
PIRACY, PROVING THE CONNECTION: LINKS BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND 
ORGANISED CRIME, available at http://www.allianceagainstiptheft.co.uk/images/Proving-
the-Connection.pdf; INTERNATIONAL ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION [IACC], THE 
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT: ECONOMIC 
HARM, THREATS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (2005), available at http://www.iacc.org/resources/IACC-
_WhitePaper.pdf.  This Note is distinct from those cited here because it is not aiming to 
prove there is a connection, but instead exactly what the connections are and what can be 
used to eradicate them. 
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plary events and studies, awareness of the issue is increasing and 
becoming generally accepted by developed state governments. 12 
 The convergence of the two areas into one now forms a new sub-
ject area of transnational organized intellectual property crime. The 
focus of this Note remains on the narrow subject of the connection 
between organized crime groups and intellectual property violations 
and its not-so-narrow impacts. This Note does not advocate that all 
intellectual property rights violations should be criminalized, but fo-
cuses on the need for stricter laws and enforcement of intellectual 
property violations that are part of organized crime. This Note (1) 
shows the importance of stopping this convergence through both 
sides—intellectual property violations and organized crime activi-
ties—due to the distinct negative consequences of each, (2) delineates 
what loopholes and common factors enhance the exploitation of intel-
lectual property rights by organized crime groups, and also (3) offers 
multilateral solutions parallel to the common factors that can help 
limit the rapid convergence of these two areas.  
II.   THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SIDE OF THE CONVERGENCE: THE 
HISTORICALLY LOW PRIORITY TO CRIMINALIZE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY VIOLATIONS  
 To date, there has been much debate about how much intellectual 
property protection is too much, particularly, which violations should 
be criminal rather than civil. This Note does not claim that all intel-
lectual property rights violations warrant tougher sanctions such as 
criminal penalties—only those that are a part of organized crime 
group activity. This is because there is concern about the ramifica-
tions of overbroad protection of intellectual property rights, particu-
larly, with criminalizing those violations.  
 Several concerns have curtailed the scope of intellectual property 
protections. Limiting the public domain is just one of these concerns. 
“ ‘Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotect-
ing it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain.’ ”13 Also, 
free speech as a fundamental right may also be hindered by over-
broad intellectual property laws.14 Furthermore, the public percep-
tions of intellectual property rights, as well as the perceptions of 
states that have addressed the issue, are not in line with criminaliz-
                                                                                                                     
 12. See supra text accompanying note 11.    
 13. Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the Rela-
tionship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 523, 532 (1997) (quoting White v. Samsung Elec. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the order rejecting the suggestion 
for rehearing en banc)).   
 14. See John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an 
Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1216. 
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ing all intellectual property violations.15 Despite the availability of 
criminal sanctions, “[i]n practice, regulators often favour giving 
guidance and quiet advice in the first instance, this being backed up 
by the possibility of administrative or civil actions, with criminal law 
being kept as something of a last resort or as a symbolic indicator 
that particularly blatant or harmful activities are not [to] be toler-
ated.”16 While these ideas may be currently accepted and considered 
legitimate limitations on a broader scale of intellectual property vio-
lations, when organized crime groups are involved with intellectual 
property violations, different rules and harsher sanctions need to be 
applied, as discussed in Parts III-V. 
III.   THE ORGANIZED CRIME SIDE OF THE CONVERGENCE: THE UNIQUE 
ASPECTS OF ORGANIZED CRIME THAT DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE 
OF PREVENTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY 
THESE GROUPS 
 There are several methods of intellectual property rights enforce-
ment, including administrative, civil, technological, and criminal.17 
Organized intellectual property crimes pose different threats and 
warrant a different view of criminalization and enforcement from in-
tellectual property violations in general, as crimes on these large 
commercial scales need greater deterrence. These distinctions make 
intellectual property violations by organized crime groups a distinct 
and important area to address. 
 In general, organized crime is dangerous to society as a result of 
the numerous effects it poses with streamlined, coordinated actions. 
Since it poses special dangers to society,18 it is treated more expan-
sively via conspiracy statutes, among others. Committing crimes 
through organized groups creates obvious efficiencies through 
“[s]pecialization of [l]abor and [e]conomies of [s]cale”—which the 
groups “exploit by creat[ing] a framework of trust to reduce the 
transaction costs involved in forming new contracts with each 
other.”19 Additionally, negative psychological implications make the 
commission of crime more likely in a group setting. Individuals in a 
group are more likely to take risks, go against self-interest, and en-
gage in crime they are committed to (similar to an obligation to fulfill 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See discussion infra Parts IV.H, V.D. 
 16. COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 1, at 87.  
 17. NASHERI, supra note 4, at 62.  
 18. There is debate about the specifics of dangers, but this Note provides only a brief 
overview and thus only discusses the generally accepted reasoning for prohibitions against 
organized crime. 
 19. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1325 (2003); see also 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1219 (1985). 
596  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:591 
 
a contract).20 The United State Supreme Court recently reiterated 
this groupthink effect: “[C]ombination in crime makes more likely 
the commission of [other] crimes” and it “decreases the probability 
that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminal-
ity.”21 The very nature of organized crime makes it important that all 
nations fight against it.22 
 Specifically, the limitations stemming from the concerns in Part II 
about intellectual property laws’ expansiveness have allowed the 
problem of intellectual property violations to grow into a commercial 
scale exploited for huge profits. These commercial scale operations 
need to be looked at as a distinct problem instead of being grouped 
with all intellectual property violations. Negative implications are 
inherent in organized crime, as opposed to individual crimes gener-
ally. Consequently, the importance of combating intellectual property 
rights in the organized crime realm is examined as a distinct topic in 
this Note. 
 A balance must be reached between the rights of all people and 
the criminalization of thefts that violate intellectual property rights 
of the rights holders. The area where organized crime and intellec-
tual property violations converge is one that needs stricter criminal 
enforcement in order to effectively impact the large scale criminal 
enterprises. By focusing on this area of convergence, it will prevent 
laws from being overbroad while still combating some of the most 
egregious rights violations. 
 Both transnational organized crime and intellectual property 
crime are separately creating enforcement problems throughout the 
world. The combination of these two developments exponentially in-
                                                                                                                     
 20. Katyal, supra note 19, at 1318-23. 
 21. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). 
[T]he act of combining with another is significant both psychologically and 
practically, the former because it crosses a clear threshold in arousing expecta-
tions, the latter because it increases the likelihood that the offense will be 
committed. Sharing lends fortitude to purpose. The actor knows, moreover, 
that the future is no longer governed by his will alone; others may complete 
what he has had a hand in starting, even if he has a change of heart. 
Katyal, supra note 19, at 1315 n.22 (quoting Model Penal Code § 5.03 cmt. (1985)). 
 22 There are critics who have questioned the reality and extent of the organization of 
crime. See, e.g., Gerben Bruinsma & Wim Bernasco, Criminal Groups and Transnational 
Illegal Markets: A More Detailed Examination on the Basis of Social Network Theory, 41 
CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 79 (2004); L. Paoli, The Paradoxes of Organized Crime, 37 
CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 51 (2002); James Sheptycki, Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, in CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, MONEY 
LAUNDERING, AND CORRUPTION 120-44 (Margaret Beare ed., 2003); Michael Woodiwiss, 
Transnational Organized Crime: The Strange Career of an American Concept, in CRITICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND 
CORRUPTION 1-31 (Margaret Beare ed., 2003). For purposes of this Note, these will not be 
discussed at length, and instead the more commonly accepted notion, as defined infra note 
5, is used, while recognizing that there can be various degrees and forms of organization 
and flexibility thereof. 
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creases the negative effects felt by either in isolation. The facilitation 
of intellectual property crime by sophisticated transnational organi-
zations is a critically important issue deserving heightened aware-
ness. These subsequent Parts do so by examining factors leading to 
the convergence and ideas for counteractive measures. 
IV.   EXPLOITED FACTORS LEADING TO ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS’ 
INVOLVEMENT IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME 
 Many developments in society provide similar, efficient avenues of 
exploitation in intellectual property crime and organized crime. Sev-
eral similar characteristics of the two areas of crime have likewise 
promoted a convergence into one organized intellectual property 
crime area. Criminals once separate under the two headings seem to 
be converging.23 This Part identifies several similar characteristics 
and modes of attack making convergence possible: low risk-high 
profit margins, technological advances, globalization, networking of 
small-time criminals with organized crime groups, intellectual prop-
erty crimes utilized as subactivities for increased funding, adaptabil-
ity, jurisdictional arbitrage, and capitalizing on societal tolerance of 
intellectual property violations. 
 Identifying the factors that create and/or increase the likelihood of 
this convergence problem is necessary in this analysis. The common 
factors highlighted below demonstrate that this phenomenon has the 
potential to grow rapidly. The focus of this Note is why the conver-
gence is growing and the factors identified are what may be making 
this convergence more likely. “The factors,” developed from observed 
recurring topics addressed in numerous articles, will subsequently be 
used to refer to the above individual factors as a set. 
A.   The Central Factor: Low Risk-High Profit Margins 
 Low risks-high profits is the central motivating factor for transna-
tional organized crime groups’ connection to intellectual property 
crime.24 Inconsistent application of organized crime laws,25 as well as 
inconsistencies in laws amongst states, have contributed to the “low-
risk” perception of both intellectual property theft and involvement 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 24. This factor has been discussed in numerous articles. See, e.g., sources cited infra 
notes 24-26.  
 25. Edgardo Buscaglia et al., UNDERMINING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME 
AND PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION: AN ESSAY ON BEST INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES 4-7, 
(Hoover Press, Essays in Public Policy No. 114, 2005), available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2833946.html (follow “pdf” hyperlinks for “Execu-
tive Summary,” “Essay,” and “Notes”). 
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in transnational organized crime groups altogether.26 These groups 
select which illegal markets to participate in depending on the risk 
versus profit margins. This may be a main reason why intellectual 
property crimes are becoming more popular for organized groups.  
One study, for example, showed counterfeiting has similar profits to 
drug trafficking but much weaker penalties.27 As one of the most fre-
quently cited problems with intellectual property crime,28 the fact 
that the benefits outweigh the risks is a highway to success for or-
ganized crime groups.  The other factors that follow all seem to have 
this low risk-high profits notion lingering in the background. 
B.   Using Advanced Technology for Commission and Facilitation of 
Crimes 
 Technology plays a major role in organized crime groups, similar 
to its role in licit businesses. These groups have the best of both 
worlds: they can be effective both cheaply and quickly with new 
technologies. Integral uses of technology include exploiting intel-
lectual property and facilitating operations, including rapid com-
munications and lowering barriers for entry into intellectual prop-
erty organized crime. 
 Exploiting intellectual property on a commercial scale is possible 
with advanced technologies. Particularly, counterfeiting, piracy, and 
other copyright violations by their nature are extremely vulnerable 
to exploitation via technology. The use of technology has allowed for 
“flawless and rapid counterfeiting.”29 The sophisticated methods used 
by these groups enable them to pirate billions of dollars worth of 
counterfeit software every year.30 Additionally, groups once focused 
on drug trafficking can now use technologies to exploit intellectual 
property rights in ways, such as over wireless networks, that may be 
harder to detect than smuggling of tangible items such as drugs. 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANTICOUNTERFEITING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 5, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_reports&docid=f:sr177.104.pdf; THE U.K. PATENT 
OFFICE, COUNTER OFFENSIVE: AN IP CRIME STRATEGY, at paras. 11, 13, available at 
http://www.patent.gov.uk/ipcrimestrategy.pdf. 
 27. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 9 (“Taking just France as an example, 
selling counterfeit products is punishable by a two-year prison term and a €150,000 fine, 
while selling drugs is punishable by a ten-year prison term and a €7,500,000 fine.”). 
 28. See, e.g., THE U.K. PATENT OFFICE, supra note 26, at paras 11, 13. 
 29. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 6, at 9. 
 30. Copyright Piracy and Links to Crime and Terrorism: Hearing Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of 
Richard C. LaMagna, Senior Manager, Worldwide Anti-Piracy Investigations, Law and 
Corporate Affairs, Microsoft Corp.). 
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 Facilitating transnational operations is easier with the internet 
and other instantaneous communication methods.31 Exchange of 
ideas can be sent thousands of miles in seconds with various online 
communication methods.32 “[O]rganized crime groups use the Inter-
net for communications”33 as well as for their criminal targets that 
can be exploited for considerable gain at low risk.34  
 Technology has not only increased the importance of intellectual 
property rights, but at the same time has lowered the barriers of en-
try for criminal groups and activities.35 Not only are more people able 
to enter, but technology has also “diversified the nature and types of 
activities that the criminal groups are involved in.”36 It is also easier 
for groups to recruit; the Internet not only aids in rapid communica-
tion but also allows for greater anonymity for new (and recurring) 
criminals to enter into these criminal groups.37 Advanced technology 
has played an integral role in the access of organized crime groups to 
potential recruits and vice versa. The following section discusses the 
result of the individual’s networking with groups to increase the ex-
pansiveness and expertise of the groups, enabling them to further 
exploit intellectual property rights. 
C.   Networking of "Small-Time" Criminals and Organized Crime 
Groups 
 Intellectual property crimes can be committed by individuals act-
ing independently, through their own expertise. Organized crime 
groups, however, are also expanding into intellectual property rights 
violations by connecting with these individuals, who often have ex-
pertise in violating intellectual property rights.38 The connection be-
tween the two kinds of criminals is “likely both to deepen and to 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Copyright Piracy and Links to Crime and Terrorism: Rep. Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property.,  108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John 
G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Criminal Div.) (“These criminal or-
ganizations are extremely security conscious, utilizing state-of-the-art technology to at-
tempt to shield their illegal activity . . . .”). 
 32. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 6, at 25. 
 33. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 5. 
 34. Phil Williams, Organized Crime and Cybercrime: Synergies, Trends, and Re-
sponses, GLOBAL ISSUES, Aug. 2001, at 22, 23, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ 
itgic/0801/ijge/ijge0801.pdf.  
 35. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY OF FORTY 
SELECTED ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS IN SIXTEEN COUNTRIES 6 (2002) [hereinafter 
UNODC, RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY], available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/ 
publications/Pilot_survey.pdf. 
 36. Id.  
 37. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 6, at 9. 
 38. See Joseph E. Ritch, They’ll Make You an Offer You Can’t Refuse: A Comparative 
Analysis of International Organized Crime, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 569, 579 (2002); 
see also WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 5. 
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widen.”39 Counterfeiters have become more like “ ‘international en-
trepreneurs’ with connections to highly organised networks.”40 Or-
ganized crime groups often recruit based on specialized knowledge to 
enhance their operations, much like a legitimate business, and 
“draw[ ] on the skills of talented individuals who have included uni-
versity graduates, accountants and lawyers.”41  
 For criminals to conduct operations on a greater scale, there is a 
need for more money and resources, which leads many to a connec-
tion with organized crime groups.42 With large amounts of money at 
stake and perceptions of intellectual property crime as victimless 
and/or justified,43 individuals may be more likely to get involved in 
transnational organized crime, which has potential for greater profits 
than when acting alone. There is a willingness of both individual 
criminals and organized crime groups to diversify their activities, 
which is important to this networking convergence.44  
D.   Engaging in Intellectual Property Violations at Varying Levels 
 Intellectual property crime fits into one of two categories in organ-
ized crime groups: either as a subactivity to facilitate and fund the 
larger criminal goals or as the group’s central activity for profit. This 
inconsistency poses difficulties for enforcement.  
 Sometimes intellectual property crimes are subactivities of trans-
national organized crime groups, designed to make another primary 
activity of the group possible.45 Thus, those side activities often are 
not done for profiting from the violation itself.46 Although some or-
ganized crime groups are known to specialize in one kind of crime, 
more and more participate in two or more criminal fields.47 A pilot 
survey published in September 2002 revealed that twenty-three of 
forty organized groups participated in more than one primary crimi-
nal enterprise.48 Additionally, those that participated primarily in one 
activity often still had some subactivities to attain the overall goal. In 
these cases the subactivities “were not carried out in the pursuit of 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 5.   
 40. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 7. 
 41. Peter Lowe, The Scope of the Counterfeiting Problem, 2 INT’L CRIM. POLICE REV. 
No. 476-477 91, 95 (1999), available at http://www.interpol.org/Public/FinancialCrime/ 
IntellectualProperty/Publications/ICPR2.pdf. 
 42. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 7. 
 43. See infra Parts IV.H, V.D (discussing negative public perceptions). 
 44. See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the diversification of organized crime 
into the white collar crime area).  
 45. UNODC, RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY, supra note 35, at 24. 
 46. Id. 
 47. COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 1, at 9. 
 48. See UNODC, RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY, supra note 35, at 24.  
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profit but instead aimed at making the primary activity of the group 
possible.”49 Frequently, these included intellectual property crime. 
 Intellectual property violations also recently have become central 
activities to organized crime groups. Counterfeiting, for example, has 
been deemed “not peripheral to other criminal activities but at the 
very heart of them.”50 Yet, the previously discussed low enforcement 
priority of intellectual property crimes has fostered the notion that 
intellectual property crimes are typically subactivities to larger 
crimes.51 As intellectual property becomes the main criminal activity 
in some organized crime groups, laws and enforcement will have to 
adapt to both larger and smaller intellectual property crime con-
ducted by these groups. This poses difficulty because it may entail 
using different types of investigations and enforcement initiatives 
depending on the purpose and role of the violations within the group. 
E.   Utilizing the “Dark Side”52 of Globalization 
 Globalization gives criminals opportunities to have the same im-
pacts in the same places while conducting the business from else-
where, often from multiple locations. “If you can sit in a kitchen in 
St. Petersburg, Russia, and steal from a bank in New York, you under-
stand the nature of the problem.”53 Products can be “manufactured in 
one country, assembled in another, transported through a third one and 
eventually sold in a fourth country.”54 Another study recently conducted 
revealed that typical organized crime groups are themselves penetrat-
ing five or more countries with their criminal activities.55  
 The increasing permeability of states’ borders to international 
trade has magnified the problem of protecting international intellec-
tual property rights56 and the exploitation of these developments by 
transnational organized crime groups.57 A smuggling ring, for exam-
ple, imported over 100 million counterfeit cigarettes by indicating 
they were toys and plastic parts on shipping documents.58 Expanding 
border measures to help seize counterfeit goods has been offset by 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Id.  
 50. Raymond E. Kendall, Editorial, Special Issue Counterfeiting, 1 INT’L CRIM. POLICE 
REV. No. 476-477 1, 2 (1999), available at http://www.interpol.int/public/ FinancialCrime/ 
IntellectualProperty/Publications/ICPR1.pdf.  
 51. See Reno, supra note 6 (discussing the historically low enforcement priority of in-
tellectual property crimes). 
 52. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 7; see also ZIJLSTRA, supra note 3, at pt. II.   
 53. Reno, supra note 6. 
 54. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 7. 
 55. UNODC, RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY, supra note 35, at 24 (“In the largest num-
ber of cases (just under half of the total number), the criminal groups in question spread 
their activities across five or more states.”). 
 56. Buscaglia et al., supra note 25, at 5. 
 57. See UNODC, RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY, supra note 35, at 24.  
 58. IACC, supra note 11, at 17. 
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the trend to promote the ease of flow of goods across borders, such as 
by the European Union and North American Free Trade Agree-
ment.59 “[I]ncreasing cross-border porosity” has added to the difficul-
ties of transnational organized crime enforcement, as these groups 
have utilized and developed their illicit businesses in a parallel man-
ner to the licit businesses.60  
F.   Adaptability of Sophisticated Yet Flexible Groups 
 Dynamic and fluid structures of organized crime groups also pose 
threats to law enforcement, which are highly rigid and directed 
groups.61 Organized crime groups are showing the potential to adapt 
and be flexible in exploiting the internet, as evidenced in the area of 
cybercrimes.62 Network–type groups, thought to be the main type in 
transnational organized crime, act more like “opportunistic busi-
nesspeople rather than violent gangsters” and are “developed in re-
sponse to criminal opportunities.”63  
 There are several ways these groups are adapting to make detec-
tion more difficult. For example, in counterfeiting, routes often 
change and groups do not use conventional or consistent networks for 
transit of products.64 Organized crime groups can compartmentalize 
and/or separate production and distribution levels and channels to 
evade legal penalties.65 Furthermore, genuine and illicit products are 
often mixed so the elicit products are harder to detect.66 These groups 
have even set up seemingly legitimate “shell companies” to disguise 
their operations67 and have “diversified into outwardly legitimate 
businesses.”68 In conjunction with the use of technology, permeability of 
borders, and jurisdictional arbitrage (subsequently discussed), the abil-
ity of these groups to adapt to avoid detection poses serious threats. 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Lowe, supra note 41, at 94. 
 60. See Buscaglia et al., supra note 25, at 5. 
 61. UNODC, RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY, supra note 35, at 6. 
 62. Williams, supra note 34, at 25. 
 63. FINCKENAUER & CHIN, supra note 2, at 22, 26; see also COUNCIL OF EUR., supra 
note 1, at 86-87 (discussing organized crime as a subset of the broader area of eco-
nomic/white-collar crime). 
 64. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 8. 
 65. See id. at 7. 
 66. Id. at 8. 
 67. Id. at 9. 
 68. Lowe, supra note 41, at 95. 
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G.   “Jurisdictional Arbitrage” 
 A lack of sufficient legal penalties and enforcement make counter-
feiting and piracy a high margin-low risk activity.69 Right now, there 
are still countries with poor intellectual property rights enforcement; 
thus, there is still a “safe place to hide.”70 Jurisdictional arbitrage re-
fers to criminals initiating their crimes from jurisdictions that have 
few or no laws against the crimes and/or little to no enforcement ca-
pabilities.71 These criminals are taking advantage of the increasing 
communications technology and lower trade barriers to commit the 
crimes where they know there is low risk of detection and punish-
ment. They do a sort of forum shopping of where to conduct their il-
licit business based on limiting their exposure to risk, similar to a 
licit business’s evaluations. They often use a developing country with 
few resources and lax enforcement as a base and then export to other 
countries.72 The groups are able to spread the risk in ways that alle-
viate them from criminal liability but maintain their complexity.73 
Even if caught, for example, they stay under minimum thresholds 
that would subject them to liability in one nation while disbursing il-
legal activities throughout other nations.74  
H.   Capitalizing on External Perceptions of Societal Tolerance of 
Intellectual Property Crimes 
 “[A] large portion of the public apparently believes that violating 
intellectual property laws of various sorts is not wrong.”75 The public 
commonly sees intellectual property rights enforcement as advancing 
commercial and private interests—rights that do not need criminal 
protection, but instead can be remedied by civil and administrative 
proceedings.76  
Recent studies have shown that: more than half of all college stu-
dents in the United States use illegal software; between fifty and 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Counterfeiting and Theft of Tangible Intellectual Property: Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Wayne] (statement of Anthony Wayne, Ass. 
Sec’y of State for Econ. and Bus. Affairs), available at 2004 WL 576628. 
 70. Reno, supra note 6 (suggesting that denial of a safe haven to organized crime 
group criminals be a top priority). 
 71. See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing jurisdictional arbitrage as it relates 
to cybercrime and organized crime).  
 72. Greg Creer, The International Threat to Intellectual Property Rights Through 
Emerging Markets, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 213, 232-33 (2004). 
 73. See UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 5. 
 74. See id.  
 75. Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observa-
tions on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 238 (2002). 
 76. Reno, supra note 6; UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 4-5 (“[A]uthorities . . . 
often still see counterfeiting as infringing the intangible property rights of financially 
sound corporate entities: businesses.”) 
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ninety percent of all computer software used is unauthorized; more 
than a third of all business software used is pirated; and unauthor-
ized taping of music CDs and video tapes is widely regarded as ac-
ceptable.77  
Organized crime groups can take advantage of this perception by 
blending in with the already expansive violations and recruiting 
other violators to participate in the organized setting. 
 In addition to negative public attitudes in general, counterfeiting 
and piracy crimes historically have been low enforcement priority for 
officials.78 Only recently the U.S. Department of Justice decided to 
“[e]mphasize the importance of charging intellectual property of-
fenses in every type of investigation where such charges are applica-
ble, including organized crime, fraud, and illegal international smug-
gling.”79 Lax enforcement of intellectual property rights stems from 
the notion that these are smaller crimes; if crimes with bigger pen-
alties are also being prosecuted, intellectual property violations are 
often ignored.80  
 Developing countries’ hunger “for rapid economic growth” may 
also lead them to ignore the future negative effects of intellectual 
property violations.81 The present activities provide countries with 
jobs and foreign currency in the short run.82 These near future atti-
tudes often lead to lack of enforcement of intellectual property 
crimes, even if they have domestic laws against the crimes.83 Organ-
ized crime groups are able to take advantage of countries that do not 
punish intellectual property crimes through jurisdictional arbitrage 
as a result of the low risks of detection.  
V.   MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS TO LIMIT THE EFFECTS OF THE 
FACTORS LEADING TO INFILTRATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED 
CRIME INTO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS CRIME 
 The United States and several other nations have, in recent years, 
acknowledged the growing problems of transnational organized intel-
lectual property crime.84 Many taskforces and divisions in agencies 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Green, supra note 75, at 236-37 (citations omitted). 
 78. Reno, supra note 6. 
 79. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 6, at 20. 
 80. See id. at 27. 
 81. Creer, supra note 72, at 232.  
 82. Sandhu, supra note 6, at 98.  
 83. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Fan, The Dilemma of China’s Intellectual Property Piracy, 4 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207, 217 (1999).  
 84. Bruce Swartz, Helping the World Combat International Crime, GLOBAL ISSUES, 
Aug. 2001, at 9, 10, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0801/ijge/ijge0801.pdf. 
For example, “[t]he U.S.-E.U. Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
held its first meeting on January 26-27, 2006 to begin planning strategies for closer coop-
eration between the United States and EU on intellectual property rights (IPR) enforce-
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have recently been dedicated to these particular issues.85 Scholars of-
ten disagree with prosecutorial agencies and industry rights holders 
as to how best to sanction intellectual property violations. Conse-
quently, there are still many areas that need enhancement and/or 
development to combat the infiltration of transnational organized 
crime into the intellectual property crime arena.  
 While domestic efforts to combat intellectual property and organ-
ized crime are important, international harmonization of laws, as 
well as international cooperation, are of utmost importance. Applying 
criminal intellectual property laws when the violations are part of an 
organized crime86 (as previously discussed in Parts II and III) and 
changing the public perceptions of acceptance are key to effective 
general deterrence. Taking into consideration the factors making this 
convergence flourish, the following demonstrates some of the promi-
nent areas in need of attention and action by all nations. 
 More resources need to be dedicated to identification and en-
forcement measures of transnational organized crime networks.87 
When laws are implemented under either organized crime or intel-
lectual property, both domestically and internationally, an aware-
ness of the others’ implications on the area at issue is necessary. 
A.   Harmonization of Laws Against Organized Crime Groups 
Exploiting Intellectual Property Rights 
 Groups use differences in laws to spread out risk amongst differ-
ent states to avoid criminal liability. “The fluid nature of interna-
tional networks makes it difficult for a single country, acting inde-
pendently, to combat criminal problems.”88 Consequently, criminals 
are basing primary functions of their operation in those countries 
                                                                                                                     
ment issues.” Stopfakes.gov., SME China IPR Advisory Program, 
http://www.stopfakes.gov/sf_archive.asp (last visited June 30, 2007). 
 85. See Swartz, supra note 84, at 10; see generally, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL CRIME & 
CORRUPTION CTR., TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CORRUPTION, AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
(2000), available at http://www.american.edu/traccc/events/reports/tcit2000.pdf (discussing 
various studies, initiatives, and directives to utilize information technology as a solution 
method to transational crime). 
 86. States may choose to criminalize membership in an organized crime group, as did 
the United States and Italy, or just criminalize those crimes that are part of a conspiracy, 
so long as organized crime groups are prohibited from performing intellectual property vio-
lations on a commercial scale. See generally Ugljesa Zvekic, International Cooperation and 
Transnational Organized Crime, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 533, 535 (1996). 
 87. See Reno, supra note 6 (discussing how the high profit potential and low risk of 
getting caught requires law enforcement officials to dedicate significant resources to inves-
tigation and prosecution). 
 88. Bruce Zagaris & Alvaro Aguilar, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Protection 
Between Mexico and the United States: A Precursor of Criminal Enforcement for Western 
Hemispheric Integration?, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 41, 48 (1994). 
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that have less strict laws (that is noncriminal) against organized 
crime, including intellectual property organized crime.  
 While some scholars oppose criminal sanctions because of the con-
cerns addressed in Part II, organized crime groups are generally un-
affected by noncriminal remedies.89 “Large-scale, commercial coun-
terfeiting and piracy operations have traditionally looked upon civil 
fines as merely the cost of doing business.”90 Because the other reme-
dies available are seen as more of a nuisance than a deterrence to 
these groups, criminal penalties for intellectual property rights viola-
tions by organized crime groups will better overcome the “cost of do-
ing business” attitude. 
 These all demonstrate the need for states to harmonize substan-
tive laws to criminalize organized crime groups violating intellectual 
property rights as well as procedural laws to facilitate effective en-
forcement and prosecution.91 Laws against organized crime should be 
harmonized within each nation to include intellectual property as 
predicate acts. Lastly, other laws and methods against instruments 
utilized by organized crime, such as drug trafficking and money 
laundering, may provide insight as well.  
1.   Harmonizing International Intellectual Property Laws and 
Organized Crime Criminalization: Substantive and Procedural92 
 Because intellectual property crimes and organized crime crimi-
nalization are generally addressed under different treaties and laws, 
gaps remain that contribute substantially to the convergence prob-
lem. There are treaties and laws that fall under the subject of intel-
                                                                                                                     
 89. See NASHERI, supra note 4, at 53 (“There is fairly general agreement that the most 
effective methods and procedures in the fight against infringement of IPRs are those in-
volving criminal enforcement.”); UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 9 (“As the risk 
for a counterfeiter of being sentenced to a severe penalty is relatively low, the organisers of 
such trafficking can easily afford the fine of a few thousand euros that they may be ordered 
to pay.”); Carol Noonan & Jeffery Raskin, Intellectual Property Crimes, 38 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 971, 973 (2001). 
 90. NASHERI, supra note 4, at 53; see also Noonan & Raskin, supra note 89, at 972 
(discussing the necessity of criminal penalties, as opposed to civil remedies, for intellectual 
property violations for deterrence).  
[B]ecause of increased technological complexity, delays in civil litigation, and 
advances in computer technology, all of which permit thieves to profit more 
rapidly from trade secrets, traditional remedies, such as injunctions and civil 
damages, have become largely ineffective. Furthermore, considering the intan-
gible nature of trade secrets and the fact that thieves are often judgment proof 
or too sophisticated to pursue, the civil remedy is quite illusory. 
Id. at 972 n.1. 
 91. See generally COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 1, at 111 (“The challenges of globalisa-
tion and economic crime cannot be addressed by individual governments or countries alone 
but must be regulated at European and global levels.”). 
 92. Note that this Section does not aim to examine differences in individual countries’ 
laws, but instead to discuss the main applicable treaties as they provide the minimum 
standards. 
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lectual property and those under organized crime. While these are 
historically distinct, it is important, since the crimes are converg-
ing, that nations harmonize laws in these areas, both substantive 
and procedural.  
 Coordination and transparency93 of nations’ criminal laws and en-
forcement efforts are paramount to curbing the trend of organized 
crime infiltrating the intellectual property theft realm. The Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the 
Universal Copyright Convention are the central multilateral intellec-
tual property protection treaties. The territorial differences in intel-
lectual property law stemming from these treaties, as well as differ-
ences in conspiracy and organized crime laws, contribute to jurisdic-
tional arbitrage and demonstrate the need for harmonization of in-
ternational laws to combat transnational organized crime exploiting 
intellectual property rights of such great magnitude.  
 These conventions, along with substantial other additions, gave 
rise to the TRIPs agreement.94 The purpose of the TRIPS Agreement 
was “to narrow the gaps in the way [intellectual property] rights are 
protected around the world, and to bring them under common inter-
national rules. It establishe[d] minimum levels of protection that 
each government ha[d] to give to the intellectual property of fellow 
WTO members.”95 Some measures and procedures are optional or not 
covered by the agreement—European Directives have been intro-
duced to address this but often remain very general.96 “The Agree-
                                                                                                                     
 93. A 2002 survey by WIPO attributed the ineffectiveness of enforcement systems to 
these problems, among others. NASHERI, supra note 4, at 71-72 (citing WIPO Doc., 
WIPO/EIM/3). 
 94. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments-Results of the Uraguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Flerida 
Ruth P. Romero, Legal Challenges of Globalization, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 
508-09 (2005). 
 95. World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited June 23, 2007). 
 96. Patrick Ravillard, Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy in the European Union, 2 
INT’L CRIM. POLICE REV. No. 476-477 60, 65 (1999), available at 
http://www.interpol.org/Public/FinancialCrime/IntellectualProperty/Publications/ICPR2.pd
f. See, for example, Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 17, avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_195/l_19520040602en00160025.pdf, 
which states the following: 
[D]espite the TRIPS Agreement, there are still major disparities as regards the 
means of enforcing intellectual property rights. For instance, the arrangements 
for applying provisional measures, which are used in particular to preserve 
evidence, the calculation of damages, or the arrangements for applying injunc-
tions, vary widely from one Member State to another. 
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ment does not stipulate which dealings in counterfeit trademark 
goods and pirated copyright goods must be treated as crimes . . . .”97 
In sum, the provisions in this treaty give substantial discretion to the 
member states as to how they penalize intellectual property crimes,98 
making consistency of intellectual property rights laws in the organ-
ized crime realm less likely. 
 Organized crime’s involvement in intellectual property violations 
was likely not a chief concern when TRIPS was adopted. TRIPS does 
provide for criminal enforcement in Article 6199 when there is 
“wil[l]ful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commer-
cial scale.”100 It seems that the “commercial scale” emphasis would be 
sufficient to cover organized crime involvement. As discussed in Part 
IV, however, this commercial scale requirement is evaded by distri-
bution of responsibilities and activities in the groups throughout dif-
ferent nations, and thus the need for harmonization of laws through-
out these different nations is still needed.  
 A way to harmonize the intellectual property and organized crime 
laws across all nations is to add a protocol to the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (TOCC),101 spe-
cifically addressing intellectual property. The TOCC was “the first 
                                                                                                                     
However, it then goes on to state that the “Directive shall not affect: . . . Member States’ in-
ternational obligations and notably the TRIPS Agreement, including those relating to 
criminal procedures and penalties.” Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
 97. Matthew Kennedy, The World Trade Organization, 2 INT’L CRIM. POLICE REV. 
No. 476-477 87, 88 (1999), available at  http://www.interpol.org/Public/FinancialCrime/ 
IntellectualProperty/Publications/ICPR2.pdf. 
 98. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 5. 
 99. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, at 345. 
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at 
least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a com-
mercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary 
fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties 
applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies 
available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the in-
fringing goods and of any materials and implements the predominant use of 
which has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide for 
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement 
of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully 
and on a commercial scale. 
Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. G.A. Res. 55/25, supra note 5. As of February 2007, there were 147 signatories 
and 118 parties to the treaty. The United States recently ratified the Convention in 
November 2005. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Signatories—U.N. Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_ 
signatures_convention.html (last visited June 23, 2007); see also Elizabeth Verville, U.S. 
Joins Global Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, GLOBAL ISSUES, Aug. 
2001, at 7, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0801/ijge/ijge0801.pdf. For a 
thorough discussion of the TOCC, see Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to Com-
bating the Financing of Crime: A Brave New World Revisited, 50 VILL. L. REV. 509, 536-45 
(2005).  
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legally binding UN instrument in the field of crime.”102 Aims of the 
new treaty include “stronger common action against money-
laundering, greater ease of extradition, measures on the protection of 
witnesses and enhanced judicial cooperation,”103 areas commonly 
used in support of transnational crime104 (all of which also contest the 
factors discussed in Part IV). 
 As enacted in September 2003, this treaty was accompanied by 
three optional substantive protocols, 105 none of which focused on in-
tellectual property organized crime. While the treaty itself will aid in 
the harmonization of laws by taking aim at some of the factors in 
general, a protocol focusing on intellectual property crimes’ connec-
tions to transnational organized crime may be a pertinent next step 
for the members.  
 The protocols already adopted are meant to ensure basic mini-
mum principles that would eliminate “safe havens.”106 In an intellec-
tual property organized crime protocol, more consistent criminal 
penalty guarantees, as well as measures to fight the spread of risk, 
are necessary. In intellectual property, minimum levels for laws as 
currently provided for in the treaties encourage wide variation in ap-
                                                                                                                     
 102. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. Convention Against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, http://www.unodc.org/palermo/convmain.html (follow “The Con-
vention” hyperlink) (last visited June 23, 2007).   
 103. Zagaris, supra note 101, at 537.  
Signatory countries undertake the following commitments in the TOCC: (1) to 
“criminalize offenses committed by organized crime groups, including corrup-
tion and corporate or company offenses; (2) to combat money-laundering and 
the proceeds of crime; (3) to accelerate and extend the scope of extradition; (4) 
to protect[ ] witnesses testifying against criminal groups; (5) to strengthen co-
operation to locate and prosecute suspects; (6) to enhance prevention of organ-
ized crime at the national and international levels; and (7) to develop[ ] a series 
of protocols containing measures to combat specific acts of transnational organ-
ized crime.” 
Id. at 537 (quoting U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, After Palermo: An Overview of What 
the Convention and Protocols Hope to Accomplish, http://www.unodc.org/adhoc/palermo/ 
sum1.html [hereinafter UNODC, After Palermo] (last visited June 23, 2007)). 
 104. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Summary of the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols Thereto, at pt. A.5(b) [hereinafter 
UNODC, Summary], http://www.unodc.org/palermo/convensumm.htm (last visited June 
23, 2007) .   
 105. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organ-
ized Crime, U.N. Doc. A/55/25/Annex 2 (Dec. 15, 2000); Protocol Against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, U.N. Doc. A/55/25/Annex 3 (Nov. 15, 2000); Protocol Against the 
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, U.N. Doc. A/55/255/Annex (May 31, 2001). 
 106. UNODC, Summary, supra note 104, at pt. A.5(b) (“Beyond this, many provisions 
are intended to ensure that the approaches taken by different states under their domestic 
legislative and law-enforcement regimes are as co-ordinated as possible to make collective 
international measures both efficient and effective.”). 
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plication. The mandates of such a protocol will relate to the intra-
state harmonization discussed in Part V.A (2), including making in-
tellectual property rights violations predicate offenses under organ-
ized crime and conspiracy statutes or enacting separate intellectual 
property organized crime laws. Mandating comparable levels when 
organized crime is involved is a more effective enforcement alterna-
tive, especially with organized crime, because inconsistency in levels 
of criminalization and punishment leads to loopholes and jurisdic-
tional arbitrage by large-scale groups. 
 An intellectual property protocol is consistent with the treaty’s 
aim to develop “a series of protocols containing measures to combat 
specific acts of transnational organized crime.”107 The treaty is rela-
tively new, however, so it may be some years to determine if extra 
guidance is needed. If the members determine additional regulation 
is necessary, intellectual property agencies—such as WIPO, WTO, 
and the Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Action Group—should 
be consulted in conjunction with the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). 
 In addition to the protocols, the UNODC expects that members 
will go beyond these minimums to adopt domestic measures and for-
mulate bilateral and multilateral treaties to create a more cohesive 
and consistent backdrop for organized criminal prosecution.108 These 
are also important, even if an intellectual property protocol is 
adopted, to coordinate organized crime laws and intellectual property 
protections. Not only must nations enhance enforcement coordina-
tion, but they must also harmonize their laws so that the organized 
crime, conspiracy, or predicate offense at issue is a crime in both ju-
risdictions.109  Thus, while entering into this protocol and other trea-
ties to increase cooperation amongst countries is important (as sub-
sequently discussed in Part V.B), it is only the first step. The treaty 
itself must mandate that each nation bring its organized intellectual 
property crime laws to a comparable level. 
 Moreover, the TOCC also provides procedural guidelines for 
transnational criminal offenses, which are relevant to intellectual 
property violations occurring across borders. Extradition and witness 
concerns are addressed in the TOCC. Predicate offenses eligible for 
extradition are defined in the treaty as any offense punishable by a 
maximum of four or more years of deprivation of liberty.110 Intellec-
tual property violations may qualify in some countries, such as the 
United States, but not in others. If extradition is not an option for 
                                                                                                                     
 107. UNODC, After Palermo, supra note 103.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Williams, supra note 34, at 25.  
 110. G.A. Res. 55/25, supra note 5, at Art. 2(b). 
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the organized crime intellectual property offenses, parties to the 
treaty should develop processes and procedures that will bring cases 
to trial quickly and address issues of victim-witness coordination in-
trastate.111 Both substantive and procedural laws need to be at com-
parable levels among nations to ensure efficient and effective prose-
cution of these criminals. 
2.   Harmonizing Intellectual Property Laws with Organized Crime 
Laws Within a Single Nation 
 The United States implemented RICO112 in the 1970s to eliminate 
“the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate 
organizations operating in interstate commerce,”113 particularly the 
Mafia. Similarly, states must delineate and parse out ways to impose 
harsher punishments on commercial scale organized crime groups 
violating intellectual property rights, even when parts of the overall 
organized crime are spread throughout many states. This should be 
considered when developing mandates of the potential protocol under 
the TOCC, previously discussed. Just as the harsher punishments 
were warranted for members of the Mafia committing crimes, as op-
posed to individuals committing those same crimes on their own, the 
same should be the case for intellectual property rights violators. The 
larger the scale of the crime, the greater the harm to societies 
throughout the world; thus, there is a greater need to deter. 
 Each nation must take action to coordinate its own laws, so intel-
lectual property crimes qualify as predicate offenses under its own 
organized crime laws. Alternatively, states that do not already have 
organized crime statutes such as RICO can create specific intellec-
tual property organized crime statutes to address the convergence 
problem, following these similar guidelines. Accordingly, legislators 
must set the maximum sentences for intellectual property crimes at 
a threshold consistent with the minimums required by organized 
crime laws.114 An industry organization’s study addressing counter-
feiting in relation to organized crime in France showed, for example, 
that “setting the maximum sentence at a three-year prison term 
would mean that industrial and commercial counterfeiting cannot be 
characterised an organised criminal activity, as the European Coun-
cil’s Joint Action . . . set the threshold of the sentence for the defini-
tion of this type of activity [organized crime] at four years.”115 In-
stead, countries should make intellectual property violations predi-
                                                                                                                     
 111. Reno, supra note 6 (suggesting closed-circuit TV for witnesses). 
 112. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (2000).   
 113. S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969). 
 114. UNION DES FABRICANTS, supra note 7, at 19. 
 115. Id. 
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cate offenses such as in the United States, where “trademark coun-
terfeiting, theft of trade secrets, and copyright violations” have all 
been made predicate acts for money laundering and RICO.116 
 Under the TOCC, countries are required to adopt domestic laws to 
“prevent or suppress certain types of organized-crime-related activi-
ties.”117 Similarly, with the adoption of an intellectual property proto-
col, signatories would be required to make their intellectual property 
laws consistent with the organized crime laws. Some measures in the 
current protocols are mandatory, while some are more flexible.118 Be-
cause organized crime groups generally have been unresponsive to 
civil penalties,119 mandatory measures to bring intellectual property 
offenses as predicate offenses that can be criminally prosecuted un-
der organized crime statutes are necessary.  
3.   Analogizing Ideas from Other Substantive Areas to Encourage 
Harmonization of Noncompliant Nations 
 While creating treaties and mandatory guidelines is useful, it is 
only valuable for signatory countries; nonjoining nations pose an-
other hurdle. Organized intellectual property crime is an “ ‘industry’ 
managed by sprawling organizations in much the same way as drug-
trafficking, gun-running and money-laundering.”120 Based on this 
idea, nations can look to these areas for guidance in harmonizing 
laws to combat this new phenomenon. Money laundering and drug 
trafficking laws are related to organized crime in a similar manner 
as intellectual property and can serve as a guide for encouraging 
compliance with international standards.  
 A few examples taken from other substantive criminal areas shed 
light on a few of many available possibilities to address noncompliant 
nations. The Financial Action Task Force of the G-7 created mini-
mum standards for countries to follow in the fight against money 
laundering.121 It named fifteen states with grossly inadequate laws, 
which prompted a change in several of those countries.122 The Council 
of Europe on Cybercrime has created a similar movement against cy-
bercrime.123 Economic sanctions and making intellectual property or-
ganized crime laws part of other important treaties are two other 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Green, supra note 75, at 236; see also 18 U.S.C. §§  1956, 1961, 2319 (2000). 
 117. UNODC, Summary, supra note 104, at pt. A.5(b). 
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 119. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 120. Reno, supra note 6.  
 121. Williams, supra note 34, at 25. 
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methods currently utilized to enhance compliance.124 A similar 
movement for intellectual property exploitation by organized crime 
groups indicating which countries need to increase both penalties 
and enforcement standards may provide a successful path for har-
monization, even with once noncompliant nations. 
B.   Coordinated Sharing of Information, Evidence, and Education by 
Law Enforcement, Intelligence Agencies, and International 
Organizations 
 Even if criminal laws are harmonized, “procedural, cultural and 
institutional asymmetries can impede law enforcement coopera-
tion.”125 Sharing information and resources amongst nations is of ut-
most importance to combat transnational organized crime groups ex-
ploiting intellectual property protections.126 “The ability of a country 
to institute adequate statutory protections is inextricably linked to 
its ability to respond to continuous refinements of technology and the 
sophistication of offenders in evading the law.”127 In order to do so, 
access to information, evidence, and resources must be available to 
all jurisdictions in which organized crime criminals are acting and/or 
affecting. Education about the developing technologies and methods 
used by these groups is paramount to eradicating organized crime 
groups’ manipulation of intellectual property rights. 
1.   Information and Evidence Sharing 
 Coordination amongst various agencies, taskforces, and law en-
forcement personnel involved in these areas, including both state and 
nonstate actors,128 is necessary due to the complexity of intellectual 
property and organized crime.129 “The main flaw in current treaties 
and negotiations to protect intellectual property rights is the lack of 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See generally, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The World Trading Organization and Law 
Enforcement: Paper Prepared for the Round Table on “Old Rules, New Threats,” COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL., Mar. 6, 2003, at pt. II.C, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/5860/world_trade_organization_and_law_enforcement.html 
(discussing WTO rules that apply broadly to goods trading, including the more specific 
category of intellectual property rights as well as “Sanctions Against Governments to Ad-
dress Non-Compliance Within a Treaty System”).  
 125. Zagaris & Aguilar, supra note 88, at 45. 
 126. See Grace P. Nerona, The Battle Against Software Piracy: Software Copyright Pro-
tection in the Philippines, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 651, 657 (2000) (“Improving the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights also requires training and educating enforcement 
officials in intellectual property.”). 
 127. Zagaris & Aguilar, supra note 88, at 44. 
 128. Id. at 48 (citing PHILLIP TAYLOR, NONSTATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
FROM TRANSREGIONAL TO SUBSTATE ORGANIZATIONS (1984) for a background discussion on 
the emergence of non-state actors).  
 129. See JHARNA CHATTERJEE, RESEARCH & EVALUATION BRANCH, COMMUNITY, 
CONTRACT, & ABORIGINAL POLICING, ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, THE CHANGING 
STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS 25-26 (2005). 
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a global enforcement mechanism.”130 Interpol, albeit a nonstate actor, 
can help provide this global enforcement mechanism on behalf of 
states. Interpol has the “ability to transmit, collect, evaluate, process, 
analyse and disseminate criminal intelligence among its 177 Member 
States to help the investigations.”131 Other relevant organizations 
need to reciprocate. For example, an important objective for the 
World Customs Organization, which polices the borders for counter-
feit products “is to build and maintain co-operation with Interpol.”132 
Intellectual property agencies should follow suit. 
 Models of enforcement should be developed based on studies and 
investigations into organized crime involvement in intellectual prop-
erty crime.133 Models should focus upon “organized crime and terror-
ist group involvement in intellectual property crime . . . ,” 
“[i]nternational cross-border multi-agency investigations into intel-
lectual property crime,” and “[e]xamin[ing] the extent to which or-
ganized crime is involved in the international trade of counterfeit 
and pirated products.”134  
 The TOCC has specific measures regarding “law-enforcement co-
operation and collection and exchange of information.”135 This should 
be used as a framework in the intellectual property prosecutions. 
Also, similar to the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement 
Coordination Council in the U.S. that brings together executives 
from many agencies to coordinate intellectual property law enforce-
ment domestically and abroad,136 the international organizations 
need to do the same to coordinate multistate enforcement initiatives. 
 One way to enhance information sharing is better communication 
channels and shared publications regarding trends, successes, and 
failures in the fight against transnational organized intellectual 
property crime. As of the 2002 report, “[n]o international organiza-
tion including INTERPOL, publishes regular global reports” on 
emerging trends in organized crime.137 The UN Transnational Organ-
ized Crime Treaty members have regularly scheduled meetings,138 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Creer, supra note 72, at 241. 
 131. Sandhu, supra note 6, at 101.  
 132. Will Robinson, The World Customs Organization, 2 INT’L CRIM. POLICE REV. 
No. 476-477 81, 83 (1999), available at http://www.interpol.org/Public/FinancialCrime/ 
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 136. 15 U.S.C. § 1128 (2000); Reno, supra note 6. 
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which should be utilized to aid in the effort to disseminate related in-
formation. Interpol has also recently released its first issue of an in-
tellectual property newsletter.139 This newsletter should include arti-
cles about large-scale criminal enterprise statistics, data, and pro-
gress (or lack thereof), similar to its Interpol-United Nations Security 
Council Special Notices regarding terrorism. This terrorism informa-
tion publication, for example, is used to help coordinate the efforts by 
alerting nations about who are targeted fugitives.140 A publication re-
garding targeted fugitives in organized intellectual property crime 
would also be beneficial. Also analogous is information currently dis-
seminated about organized drug trafficking.141 It can serve as a 
model for what information is helpful in the fight against intellectual 
property organized crime.142 These publications can serve as models 
to coordinate enforcement and disseminate the pertinent information 
regarding the intellectual property/transnational organized crime 
convergence. Incorporating these ideas into Interpol's already ex-
isting, new intellectual property newsletter will make all nations 
better informed. 
 These are not the only methods to enhance coordination and 
communication, but are representative of the possible opportunities. 
As noted in the next section, education is extremely important as 
well. With better education and understanding of the complexities 
involved with both intellectual property rights and organized crime 
groups, better coordination will follow. 
2.   Educating Through Past Success and Training for Future 
 A convergence of intellectual property protection groups and 
criminal enforcement groups is necessary to enhance education of 
each. Expertise of traditionally-focused-intellectual-property groups 
is needed, so governments and enforcement officials can understand 
the importance of intellectual property violations, criminal tactics, 
and other related issues. Law enforcement agencies, namely Interpol, 
need to work more closely with agencies that have substantive ex-
perience and knowledge in intellectual property, including WIPO, 
WTO, and Interpol’s Intellectual Property Crime Action Group, 
which is a subgroup of the only international enforcement agency fo-
cusing on substantive problems in intellectual property protection.  
                                                                                                                     
 139. Interpol Intellectual Property Crime Action Group Newsletter (IIPCAG, Lyon, 
France), Winter 2006, available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/Intellectual 
Property/Publications/IIPCAGNewsletter01.pdf.  
 140. Interpol, United Nations Security Council Special Notices, 
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 Governments must also be educated regarding best practices to 
implement laws and other solutions. “States are encouraged to sup-
port one another with resources or technical expertise where needed” 
in implementing laws to bring the terms of the TOCC into force in its 
jurisdiction.143  
The U.S. government, in cooperation with Italy and international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, has been active in help-
ing interested countries, such as Mexico, develop their own organ-
ized crime legislation to facilitate the investigation and prosecu-
tion of organized crime. As a result, Mexico enacted a Federal Or-
ganized Crime Act on October 18, 1996.144  
 Another example of educational efforts include providing guidance 
for legislation under the TOCC and its new legislative guide.145 The 
World Customs Organization also has drafted model customs legisla-
tions to help countries drafting or revising their texts.146 As these ex-
amples indicate, past successes shared among nations help train 
them for effective enforcement in the future. 
 In addition to educating governments, instructing law enforce-
ment officials about emerging trends147 and best practices is also 
critical. Interpol, as the world’s largest police organization, should 
take a central role coordinating and distributing educational forums 
and materials. Programs similar to the World Customs Organiza-
tions’ videos created to increase intellectual property rights viola-
tions awareness amongst its staff members should also be imple-
mented148 to increase intellectual property awareness within criminal 
enforcement agencies and organized crime awareness in intellectual 
property protection groups. Experiences in drug trafficking enforce-
ment and other crimes often associated with organized crime can 
serve as examples for enforcement, as the use of drug trafficking to 
support these enterprises has been compared to these groups’ uses of 
intellectual property crimes.149  
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C.   Investigations: Focus on the Finances, a Central Element to 
Transnational Organized Crime and Intellectual Property Crime 
 Transnational organized crime groups engage in their activities 
primarily for profit.150 Similarly, money laundering is a primary ac-
tivity of organized crime groups.151 They also need money to facilitate 
the actions of their groups and, therefore, must transfer money 
amongst members. Finances and corresponding concerns infiltrate 
almost every aspect of organized crime. Controlling the exchange 
of money that facilitates and provides profits for these groups has 
proven to be one of the most successful approaches to combating 
organized crime.152 
 Detecting “dirty” money and illicit transactions, however, has 
proven to be difficult. Groups that have outwardly entered into le-
gitimate businesses, as discussed in Part IV.F and G, have created 
an ideal structure to hide financial streams of illegitimate activities. 
“[P]rofits . . . [are] being washed through outwardly legitimate enter-
prises.”153 Thus, increased efforts and resources need to be concen-
trated on financial routes and transfers during investigations. 
 The TOCC “aims to tackle the root cause of transnational crime—
profit.”154 It requires “signatory countries to enact anti-money laun-
dering and asset forfeiture techniques against transnational organ-
ized crime.”155 In addition to these relevant provisions, enforcement 
official must study financial aspects, as well as focus investigations 
on the methods groups are using to evade detection in their financial 
transfers. By stopping the means by which the groups operate, more 
intellectual property crimes will be identified and groups uncovered. 
D.   Changing the Public Perception of Intellectual Property Crimes in 
General 
 Current perceptions, previously discussed in Part IV.H, can be 
changed in a variety of ways. The focus must be to raise knowledge 
on the issue and change the general cultural acceptance of theft of 
intellectual property, so the will to enforce intellectual property laws 
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will be stronger.156 Even though there are many reasons for public 
disagreement regarding intellectual property, as noted in Part II, 
changing the acceptance of violations is important to combating the 
avenues organized crime groups utilize to exploit intellectual prop-
erty rights and ultimately profit. 
 To induce other countries—especially developing countries, which 
frequently oppose enforcement157—to cooperate in initiatives and 
take on their own enforcement initiatives, the psychological impact 
and reasoning of why intellectual property rights are important must 
penetrate those societies. Many of the United States reports, such as 
the Department of Justice’s Task Force report, focus on the growth 
and innovation in the American economy.158 This view needs to be 
expanded to a consistent global view of economic growth—how intel-
lectual property right protections can enable growth in all societies. 
One report notes that the U.S. is interested in strengthening intellec-
tual property enforcement for at least two reasons: “(1) the economic 
benefits to the United States which enhanced enforcement of IP 
could yield; and (2) a belief that improved protection of IP is essential 
for the economic development of all countries.”159 Whether these 
claims are valid or not is not at issue. Rather, the perceptions these 
goals portray are important; the focus needs to be on the latter to 
change the tide of cultural acceptance of intellectual property theft in 
other countries. Instead of focusing on benefits to only the United 
States and other developed countries, the primary focal point must 
include all the societies of the world, with a special emphasis on 
developing countries. 
 There is a need to educate people that the local artists and inno-
vators, especially in countries with poor legal and enforcement 
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frameworks, are the ones often hurt because counterfeiters and pi-
rates defeat any chances to even begin showcasing talents.160 The na-
tions and their constituents need to understand the importance of in-
tellectual property protection in the relevant context of their own 
economic development, rather than the benefit for the United States 
and other developed countries only. By building domestic constituen-
cies who see the importance of intellectual property protections, there 
will be greater, positive pressure on each domestic government to com-
ply.161 Only with changes in perception will other possible solutions, like 
legal harmonization and enforcement coordination, be possible. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Prompt attention to the connection between transnational organ-
ized crime and intellectual property crime can combat the potential 
permanency of organized crime in intellectual property theft. Much 
of organized crime and intellectual property theft is seemingly an un-
touchable problem because it often occurs unnoticed. This is only ex-
acerbated by the fact that intellectual property rights themselves are 
intangible property. The key to combating this problem is to “disable 
each link in the chain of these crimes”162 by defeating organized 
crimes that are fostering the spread of intellectual property viola-
tions. By examining commonalities, as well as multilateral solutions, 
this convergence can be decelerated.  
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